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THE 1976 UNITED STATES SENATE 
CAMPAIGN OF DAVID BOL!Na 
A SPEECHWRITER'S PERSPECTIVE 
John J. Conner 
David G. Bolin, Smyrna attorney, was a candidate for 
the 1976 Democratic nomination for the United States Senate. 
Informal polls showed that Bolin was the early frontrunner 
for the nomination. 1 Yet on August 5, he captured only 
forty-four thousand and fifty-six votes and finished fourth 
behind nominee James Sasser, three-time loser John J. Hooker, 
and Madison automobile dealer Harry Sadler. 2 What then were 
the factors which caused him to run so poorly in this Democra-
tic primary? 
This paper provides an analysis of the Bolin for 
United States Senate campaign. The author has attempted to 
present an overall campaign picture. Readers should be aware 
that he was very much ego-involved with Bolin. Starting in 
April, 1976, and continuing through August 5, the author either 
worked in the state campaign headquarters or traveled with and 
for the candidate practically every day. He wrote many of 
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the statements and press releases made by Bolin. In addition, 
he worked with the chief researcher to prepare the ten position 
papers released by Bolin during July. 
In analyzing the campaign, this report will first 
discuss those positive factors which existed in the Bolin 
campaign, next suggest some serious liabilities, and finally 
examine the candidate as a speaker. 
CAMPAIGN ASSETS 
Bolin was the frontrunner early in the campaign 
because he got off to a fast start. He actually decided to 
run in late 1975 and began to put his organization together 
at that time. Because he started much earlier than the 
other candidates, Bolin was able to establish a campaign 
organization throughout the state at an early date. 
In 1974, Bolin had been Governor Ray Blanton's state 
campaign manager. While this association proved to be a 
liability in some respects, it was a positive factor in the 
early stages of the campaign. As he formed his organization, 
the candidate enlisted many of the same people who had worked 
in the Blanton campaign. As a result of these and other 
state contacts, Bolin had organized approximately seventy 
counties with a committee chairman and at least two or three 
committee members by May of 1976.3 By election day, the 
Bolin staff had ninety-two of the ninety-five counties 
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organized. The remaining three had representatives who 
distributed literature and posted Bolin signs. 4 
Bolin was able to secure the services of able campaign 
aides. He chose mostly young people for his headquarters 
staff, and despite their political inexperience, the majority 
of them performed credibly. Significantly, the Bolin campaign 
had no payroll. Several of the staff members received 
expense money but no one was salaried. Many of the state 
headquarters staff received no financial remuneration for 
their contributions of time and effort to the campaign. They 
worked for David Bolin because they believed he was the man 
for the job. 
Another significant plus for Bolin was his personal 
makeup. He was and is an extremely hardworking young man. 
He asked no one to work harder than he did. No member of his 
campaign staff labored more diligently than did the candidate. 
On many occasions he would return home from a day o~ campaigning 
at laOO or 2a00 A. M. and by 6aOO A. M. would be on the road 
again. He had a remarkable ability to be fresh, alert, and 
pleasant throughout the campaign. 
This writer is convinced that Bolin was and is honest 
and sincere. He campaigned on the theme of honesty and 
faith in government. He believed in what he was saying, and 
had he been elected, without a doubt would have worked for 
the participatory government which he advocated. Bolin 
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campaigned for a government in which people could be 
involved after election day.5 He promised to establish 
a communications system which would make the office of 
the United States Senator accessible and available to the 
people of Tennessee. Again this author believes that this 
promise was more than campaign rhetoric. Bolin sincerely 
believed in what he was saying. 
A final asset for the candidate was his ability to 
relate to citizens on a one-to-one basis. He exuded a self-
assurance which made people respond to him very positively. 
He had an almost infectuous grin and once told the writer 
that one of the things he enjoyed most about campaigning 
was making people smile by being friendly with them. It 
is the opinion of this writer that Bolin's strongest asset 
was his ability to shake hands with the voters and make them 
feel good and important to him. 
CAMPAIGN LIABILITIES 
Unfortunately, only half of the picture has been 
presented at this point. The Bolin campaign also have some 
damaging liabilities. Two of those liabilities -- money 
and name recognition -- are of equal significance. The 
campaign was beset with financial problems from the very 
beginning. Bolin chose to take his campaign to the people 
and declined to seek the support of the strong financial 
interests throughout Tennessee. Thus he relied mainly on 
contributions of one hundred dollars or less. The little 
interest in this race -- attested to by the low voter 
turnout on August 5 combined with small contributions 
caused the campaign to cut back its efforts in some very 
vital areas. While other candidates were buying billboard 
space, newspaper ads, and radio and television spots, Bolin 
was forced to rely mainly on handshaking and word-of-mouth 
publicity to win votes. 
If the candidate had possessed high name recognition 
among the voters, the lack of publicity would not have been 
nearly as damaging as it was. One of his opponents, John 
Jay Hooker, did possess high name recognition and as a result 
engaged in very little publicity until shortly before the 
election. Of course, the fact that Hooker lost indicates 
that publicity is necessary even with high name identity. 
But the polls indicated that Bolin had about five percent 
name recognition in June -- hardly enough to win a statewide 
campaign. 6 No formal polls were conducted to gauge name 
recognition later in the campaign, but it is likely that he 
failed to achieve more than twenty-five percent name identity 
by election day. 
These liabilities worked hand in hand against Bolin. 
Had he been able to buy advertising, he could certainly have 
raised his name recognition level. By the same token, if he 
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had had more name recognition, he would have received more 
contributions from the electorate. 
In addition to the two major liabilities discussed 
above, Bolin's campaign had other difficulties. His lack 
of experience as a candidate was damaging to his cause. 
This was his first attempt to win public office. He had 
great difficulty turning the campaign over to his staff 
and trusting its judgment while he took his case to the people 
as a candidate. In retrospect, Bolin might have been wise 
to begin his political career by seeking an office which 
would not have required a statewide campaign with its extensive 
time, financial, and organizational demands. 
The candidate was experienced in political campaigns, 
having worked for John Kennedy, Buford Ellington, and Ray 
Blanton. But most of his efforts in those campaigns were 
in campaign organization. Thus his natural bias was to stress 
organization to the detriment of other important areas such 
as finance, research, speeches, press conferences, and press 
relations in general. This neglect led to serious problems 
with press releases and public statements, as is indicated in 
the next section of the paper. 
A serious problem for Bolin was the strong support of 
Governor Blanton and his followers for the candidacy of James 
Sasser. As has been reported in the Tennessee press, 7 Blanton 
was instrumental in raising money for Sasser and in influencing 
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people throughout the state to support him. Even though 
many polls indicated that Blanton was an unpopular ~overnor 
in 1976, he was able to use the power of his office to provide 
much needed support and money for Sasser's candidacy. 
It is extremely significant that in May and in June, 
Sasser possessed only about five percent name recognition --
almost exactly that with which Bolin started. But because 
Sasser was able to raise money and enlist broad Democratic 
organizational support, he increased that name recognition 
factor and became a viable option to John Jay Hooker. Results 
of the election indicate that the voters sought an alternative 
to Hooker. That Sasser became that alternative was the major 
reason for his victory. 
One final liability leads to the third area of considera-
tion. Bolin was not a strong public speaker. During the 
course of the campaign he did show significant improvement 
as he gained both experience and confidence. His speaking 
ability, nevertheless, was more of a liability than an asset. 
The final section provides an analysis of Bolin as a speaker. 
BOLIN - THE POLITICAL SPEAKER 
It is unlikely that Bolin's speaking ability or lack 
of it cost him the election. As indicated earlier, the two 
major factors in this unsuccessful campaign were a lack of 
money and low name recognition. Yet this writer believes that 
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Bolin could have influenced more people and increased the 
number of votes which he received had he been more willing 
to work on his speeches, interviews, and press conferences. 
Earlier it was stated that the candidate was oriented 
to campaign organization as a result of his experience in this 
area. He is extremely good at campaign organization. As a 
candidate, however, he needed to leave it for others to do. 
In devoting so much time to organization, he neglected some 
very vital matters which a statewide candidate must attend to. 
It was difficult to get him to schedule press briefings or 
appointments for discussion of the issues. Although his 
research division formulated and published ten position 
papers, Bolin was never as knowledgeable about them as he 
could and should have been. Those times when he did attempt 
to read and digest prepared materials, he was so preoccupied 
with organization that he failed to absorb important issues 
and news items. 
As a result of this lack of knowledge, Bolin often 
was reluctant to say anything of substance. He feared being 
caught in contradictions and erroneous statements. 
To his credit, he did begin in July to discuss issues 
such as social security, energy conservation, alternative 
energy sources, and employment and inflation. One of his 
best issue statements was made in Murfreesboro at a Bolin 
rally on the issue of social security. Following is a portion 
of that statementa 
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The situation is thus bleak for the thirty-two million 
Americans on social security and for all of us who look 
forward to social security as a substantial part of 
our retirement income. What are we to do about it? 
1. I would like to see the next Congress pass a reso-
lution that would state its intent to guarantee the 
security of payment of benefits now and in the future. 
2. We must view the system realistically. It is not an 
insurance plan but instead a tax. Our future policy 
should be based on that view. 
3· We must formulate and fund programs that will ease 
the burden of unemployment and inflation. The 
Humphrey-Hawkins employment act is a good start. 
We need more legislation like it. 
4. We must raise the maximum level of taxable income 
for both employers and employees. In order to 
better share the cost of social security among 
the poor, middle-class, and affluent in our society, 
we believe that the maximum level should be raised 
to $28,000. 
5· We must push for a repeal of the present law which 
provides for a double-index in computing social 
security benefits and support stronger legislation 
to protect our older citizens.B 
Throughout the campaign Bolin preferred to rely on 
one set speech which usually began and ended the same wa.y. 
The speech was between three and five minutes long and soon 
became rather trite and boring. Had there been some inspira-
tional phrases in it which stimulated the listeners, the set 
speech would have been much more acceptable. But unfortunately 
he said little about which the listeners could get excited. 
Bolin was either unable or unwilling to take new 
ideas and incorpora te them into his speeches. Even if he had 
material which he realized would help the speech, he felt 
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that he had ·to know it thoroughly before using it publicly. 
Unfortunately his campaign priorities seldom allowed him 
time to learn new material. 
His hesitation to depart from the set speech was 
due to extreme nervousness and stagefright in the early 
going. As the campaign progressed, he did overcome much 
of his fear of speaking. Yet he remained either unable 
or afraid to incorporate new ideas while delivering a speech. 
This writer considers this inability to incorporate new 
and timely ideas a serious deficiency in Bolin's speech 
preparation and presentation. 
Although he had the aid of people who were politically 
knowledgeable and competent in research and speechwriting, 
Bolin was unwilling to accept material prepared for a speech 
or news conference as he received it. Inevitably, he would 
make lengthy changes in anything which he received. Oftentimes 
speeches, news releases, and statements which had been analyzed 
and approved by the entire communications staff would be 
changed drastically by the candidate. His justification 
usually was that the material just did not "feel right." 
These changes took a great deal of the candidate's time as 
well as that of his staff and were depressing for the staff 
members. 
Certainly any candidate has the right to guide his 
own words. It is after all the candidate who is offering 
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himself to the public. Thus Bolin's penchant for exten-
sive rewrites would have been acceptable had he been able 
to improve or significantly change the ideas or thrust 
of his statements. But usually he neither improved the 
material nor changed the ideas. Instead, his changes often 
ended up being little more than word selection, word order, 
or minor organizational changes. Many times he preferred 
to insert some of his time worn phrases in exchange for 
fresh and interesting approaches, a futile endeavor that 
only consumed valuable time. This continuous practice by 
the candidate was one of the most frustrating parts of the 
entire campaign. 
Bolin's performance in the interview situation · was 
a significant part of his campaign communication. In fact, 
he probably was involved in many more interviews than speech 
situations. His usual mode of operation was to dominate the 
interview with long-winded answers replete with stories and 
campaign experiences.9 Because he was unfamiliar with many 
issues, Bolin attempted to keep the number of questions 
small, thus minimizing the chances that he would contradict 
himself or be asked about something with which he was 
unfamiliar. Perhaps this strategy was sound for the candi-
date, but it certainly left some reporters and voters with 
the impression t hat he had little to say. 
Thus, in general, Bolin's speaking was something less 
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than an asset for him. All of the preceding comments 
are not to say that he had or has no ability or potential 
as a speaker. The improvement which he demonstrated from 
April to August was significant. The major problem was 
that the last four months are not the time in a political 
campaign to be improving. Had he realized how much improvement 
was needed, Bolin could have polished his speaking ability 
prior to the buildup of the campaign pressures of May, June, 
and July. 
Bolin's approach to the tone of his statements must 
be discussed at this point. Throughout the campaign he 
constantly reminded his staff that he wanted to run a positive 
campaign -- certainly a noble aim for the candidate. Bolin 
never really understood, however, what a positive campaign 
consists of. He was unwilling to state situations which 
existed -- with all of the negative factors involved -- and 
then talk about why he and his programs were needed to 
improve flaws in the status quo. Bolin was reluctant to 
criticize anyone or any program except on a broad basis such 
as the "social security systemff or "national energy conserva-
tion." As a result, his statements and releases were seldom 
newsworthy and were often ignored by the press, much to the 
frustration of the staff. 
As Brown a nd MaKay state in their book, The Rhetorical 
Dialogue, "Something is newsworthy if it is new, unique, 
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controversial, unexpected, or deals with conflict, attack 
or change." 10 Bolin's concept of what was newsworthy was 
far different from the above explanation. 
By June it was obvious that if Bolin were to have 
any chance to win the race, he had to rid himself of the 
stigma of his association with Governor Blanton, especially 
since Blanton had thrown his support to Sasser. Practically 
every exposure which he received from the media labeled him 
as Blanton's 1974 campaign manager. In light of Blanton's 
reported unpopularity and because Blanton had chosen not 
to help him, it was apparent that the campaign efforts were 
being harmed by this association. 
Notwithstanding, Bolin was reluctant to criticize the 
governor or any of his people. He was very much concerned 
with party unity after the primary and did not wish to alienate 
any Tennessee Democrat. It was not until late June that he 
decided that he had to speak out concerning some of the 
campaign tactics being used by members of the Governor's 
staff· It was not the urging of his advisors which made him 
decide to criticize the Governor. Instead Bolin began to 
see first hand that pressure was being exerted on his 
supporters either to work for Sasser or to stay out of the 
race. The candidate decided that he could not stand silently 
while this pressure was being exerted on the voters. 
Following Bolin's decision to speak out, sessions were 
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held at state headquarters on June 24 and 25 to plan the 
strategy. The first major statement was set for Tuesday, 
June 29, at the Governor's fundraiser rally in Blountville. 
At that time Bolin planned to criticize Blanton for viola-
ting his pledges of neutrality by working for Sasser and 
by exerting pressure on Bolin supporters. The statement 
read a 
Power-broking is occurring in the back rooms in an 
attempt to subvert the will of the majority of Democrats 
across the state • • • • We cannot allow the power-
brokers to subvert the will of Tennesseans in this 
Senate race. 
When I decided to run for the United States Senate I 
didn't seek anybody's permission. And I didn't go to 
the power-brokers and money-changers to beg for their 
support. 
My candidacy carne from the people, and it is still by 
and with the people. 
When I announced my candidacy, the governor promised 
his neutrality until after the August 5th primary. We 
were all promised that the power of Tennessee state 
government would never be turned against its own people, 
or against the Democratic party. 
The time has come to demand that that promise be kept. I 
have no quarrel with any elected official or party leader 
who wants to work openly and positively for one of my 
opponents. That is their (sic) right and their (sic) 
privilege. 
But I will not sit in silence and watch my supporters 
tell me with tears in their eyes that they are going to 
vote for me but they cannot work openly for me because 
they will lose their jobs or they will lose business with 
the state if they do. When our people are this much 
mistreated , it is a blatant abuse of power. It is both 
immoral and dishonest. 
I challenge every public official and every party leader 
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to set this party free and let the people decide 
who the Democratic Party nominee will be.ll 
Bolin also planned to attack the kind of politics 
in which party leaders attempt to influence the electorate 
to support a particular candidate through "behind the 
scenes maneuvering," or, in other words, "power-broker 
politics... These comments were to be made face to face 
with the governor and in the presence of the other candi-
dates. 
On June 25, however, Bolin decide d to go ahead 
with these comments at a Democratic rally in Chattanooga. 
The effect was extremely positive for the candidate. 
Newspapers throughout the state reported Bolin's comments, 
some as a leading story. 12 Bolin had definitely made an 
impact in the race by going on the offensive and showing 
that, indeed, negative factors did exist in the status 
quo and that these things had to be rejected by the voters. 
Campaign staff morale rose tremendously. Bolin had 
made a giant stride toward becoming a strong challenger to 
John Jay Hooker. Strategy was quickly formulated to continue 
with a stronger statement at Blountville. Unfortunately, it 
never happened. By June 29, both Blanton and Sasser were 
aware of the Chattanooga statement and had prepared their 
own remarks about party unity and those candidates who would 
divide the party. Instead of continuing on the offensive 
in spite of these statements, Bolin backed off and talked 
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instead about other topics. 
From that time until election day, it was a continuing 
story of attack and retreat, attack and retreat. Bolin had 
found the issue that he so desperately needed but was unable 
to capitalize on it as he had to in order to show that he 
was definitely a candidate capable of winning the primary. 
These statements -- even though they were not as 
strong as they staff recommended -- did succeed in ridding 
Bolin of the Blanton stigma. Other candidates began to 
brand Sasser as Blanton's hand-picked candidate. When it 
became apparent that Blanton was supporting Sasser, Sasser 
assumed the role of the Governor's choice. Blanton and 
Sasser continued to deny that the Governor was supporting 
Sasser. But, as was stated earlier, it is generally agreed 
that Blanton was very important in Sasser's winning effort. 
Perhaps it is possible to conclude from Sasser's strong 
showing that the Governor may not be as unpopular in the 
state as polls have indicated. 
Thus the race continued with each candidate attempting 
to show that the contest was between John Jay Hooker and 
himself. The election remained very dull. Low voter turnout 
on August 5 testified to the sparse interest in the race. 
The issue became one of who could succeed in polarizing the 
race and become more attractive than the old standby, John 
Jay. The answer was that Jim Sasser was able to do just that. 
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In the last two weeks of the campaign, Sasser flooded the 
television with his promotional spots. The press began to 
comment that the race appeared to be between Hooker and 
Sasser, and in the voters' minds it became just that. Bolin's 
campaign, from that time on, was on a continuous decline. 
Apparently, the voters of Tennessee were determined 
to put an end to the political career of John Jay Hooker. 
The anti-Hooker sentiment was far deeper than many people 
thought. Because of his massive television campaign, because 
of the help of Governor Blanton and the party regulars, and 
because he was a fairly attractive candidate, Sasser was 
able to project himself as a worthy alternative to John Jay 
Hooker. That left Bolin along with Kefauver and Sadler out 
of the picture. None of them was able to become an attractive 
candidate for the Democratic nomination to run against Bill 
Brock. These factors plus the low voter turnout combined to 
allow Sasser to win the nomination. 
While Bolin could not be classified as a good speaker, 
he definitely improved as the campaign progressed. This writer 
believes that he profited from the mistakes of this first 
campaign. In order to be a more effective campaigner, Bolin 
must remember to mention those things which are wrong with the 
status quo and then show that he offers a better alternative 
for improvement. Bolin must be more willing to heed the advice 
of his aides. He must believe in their work as well as their 
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desire to help him and let them run his campaign. 
If he does offer himself to the people, David 
Bolin certainly can be a viable candidate for public office 
in the years ahead. He is a bright, young man who has 
stated his desire to serve the people of Tennessee. He 
advocates government in which people are involved and in 
which people have a say about what government does. The 
writer believes that Bolin represents the kind of government 
which most people want in the years ahead. The experience 
of a state-wide race will doubtless be valuable if and when 
he runs again. 
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NOTES 
John J. Conner is an assistant professor of speech 
communication at Middle Tennessee State University. 
1The wr.iter had frequent conversations with Bolin and 
other staff members. Information which the staff received 
indicated that Bolin won some of the polls taken at the 
Governor's multi-county fundraisers. Because other candi-
dates did not announce their intentions early, Bolin received 
notice as the senatorial candidate. 
2
official total as recorded by the Tennessee State 
Election Commission. 
)Bolin kept an up-to-date map of the state which was 
color coded depending on the degree of organization. In 
addition, written records were kept concerning the status 
of each county organization. 
4The records referred to above indicated that all but 
three counties were organized by election day. 
5Bolin believed that most politicians are interested in 
the people only until they get elected. He wanted to establish 
open lines of communication which would allow the voters ready 
accessability to the senator's office at any time. 
6This figure is based on a poll conducted by professional 
pollster Pat Caddell. Mr. Tom Griscom, political writer for 
the Chattanooga Free Press communicated this information to the 
Bolin camp and also ran it in his newspaper column. 
7Nashville Tennessean, August 8, 1976. 
8 Excerpt from speech given at Murfreesboro Bolin-For-
Senate Rally, May 28, 1976. 
9This statement is based on personal observations. The 
writer accompanied Bolin when he was interviewed by the 
editorial board of the Nashville Tennessean, by Mr. Lee Smith, 
publisher of the Tennessee Journal, and by reporters for the 
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Cleveland Banner, Murfreesboro Daily News Journal and 
Nashville Banner. This statement is also based on the 
writer's impression of Bolin's appearance on the Teddy 
Bart Show, a Nashville afternoon radio talk show. 
10John J. MaKay and William R. Brown, The Rhetorical 
Dialogue, Contemporary Concepts and Cases. Dubuquea William 
c. Brown Company, 1972, P• 451. 
11This excerpt is from remarks prepared for delivery at 
the Governor's Fundraiser Rally in Blountville, Tennessee. 
Because Bolin decided to launch his attack in Chattanooga 
four days prior to the rally, these remarks were never 
delivered. 
12The Chattanooga Free Press and the Nashville Banner 
carried lengthy reports of the meeting and of Bolin's comments. 
Several smaller newspapers, both daily and weekly, reported 
the story during the following days. Bolin's comments were 
also aired throughout the state via radio and television. 
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